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I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM

The twentieth century could very well be coined the century of the
automobile. This invention, which is really the combination of thousands of
inventions, has drenched the fabric of our lives by capitalizing on a simple
formula embedded in our DNA: personal motion = personal freedom = desire.
In order to fuel the desire, a whole industry has been built up through the last
century to make sure that the roughly 20,000 parts are properly designed,
fabricated, sold, shipped, and integrated into a car. In just about any country
in the world, there is probably some activity
relating to the automotive
47
industry - it is the archetypal big business.
Americans are generally led to believe that the automobile is
something fundamentally American, but this belief is misleading. Although
Henry Ford, an American, was among the first to promote the idea of a massmarketed automobile, Europeans such as Daimler, Benz, and Panhard
performed much groundwork prior to Ford. 4 8 Henry Ford, seeking new
markets and recognizing that the formula for personal freedom was
universally understood, set up facilities for auto production in Europe, Japan,
and South America. In more recent times, the capitalistic pressures for higher
efficiency, lower cost, and better products along with the basic human. pursuit
of the formula have pushed the automobile and its production to the four
comers of the globe.
Such globalization has been augmented by the refinement of the
computer. Inventions such as the computer and the automobile have made
our world yet smaller and yet faster. Indeed the twenty-first century could
4' See, e.g., U.S. Bureau of Census, Annual Survey of Manufacturers - 2000, Issued February, 2002,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/m00as-I.pdf. In the United States alone, the value of
motor vehicle manufacturing shipments (e.g. the as-produced value of the cars) in the year 2000 accounted
for approximately 1I% of all goods manufactured. A motor vehicle is I of 473 classes of such
manufactured goods.
'8 See THOMAS GILLESPIE, FUNDAMENTALS OF VEHICLE DYNAMICS 2 (1992)
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probably be coined the century of the computer. The computer has
compressed our world into milliseconds. A business plan developed in
Germany can be emailed to the United States for review and an edited
version can be exchanged several times in the same day.
The efficiency gained from such reduction in time has mated well
with the drive for efficiency in the automotive industry. As international
borders have succumbed to the capitalist goals of big business and human
desires for personal freedom, the automotive industry has gone global,
National and regional automotive
accelerated by the computer.
manufacturers (OEM's) such as Ford, General Motors, PSA, Toyota, VW,
DaimlerChrysler, and Renault/Nissan now have operations in across the
globe. However the globalization of the industry has not been confined to
OEM's, but has also spread to suppliers.
The ocean of capitalism bears its pressure even on the tiniest creature
in the automotive supply chain. The drive for efficiency, quality, and
technical excellence, as well as the desire for more cash, has pushed
automotive suppliers to expand and follow their customers across boundaries.
For many smaller suppliers, these forays have been quixotic and sometimes
disappointing. Despite the fact that at the beginning of the computer century
it may seem easy to envision setting up a business in another country, since
most of the information is available over the internet at the touch of a button
and communication is so rapid, the inexperienced get mired in the oldfashioned legal issues. Many a business venture gets killed because of
misunderstanding and down right fear of international legal issues.
The words liability and recallstrike fear in the heart of even the most
seasoned business person. In the United States, we associate the words with
multi-million dollar awards, injured plaintiffs, overly-enthusiastic plaintiffs
lawyers, lost earnings (and lost profit-sharing checks), and rising insurance
premiums. The liability and recall lexicons are at home in the auto industry.
Unfortunately, very often the entwinement of the automobile with
our daily lives brings this invention to center stage in litigation, especially in
the area of products liability. Indeed, where would American products
liability law be with out the automobile; the classic cases concern
automobiles. 49 The automobile represents a special challenge for several
reasons: 1) the level of complexity; 2) the shear volume of units placed in the
hands of consumers; 3) the lack of experience of users; 4) the level of risk the
user is subjected to when an auto accident occurs; 5) automotive companies,
due to their size, are tempting targets for litigation.

'9 See, e.g., Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., I I I N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Henningsen v. Bloomfield

Motors Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)
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The globalization of the auto industry has brought about the need for
managers to clearly understand the product liability issues when marketing
autos in various countries and also the need for lawyers to understand
comparative values to be able to effectively litigate, especially with
international clients. European automakers are sued in the United States and
US automakers receive likewise treatment in Europe. 50 The basic doctrine of
product liability used in the United States is not very different than the
doctrine used in Europe; however, it is the manner and the societal
environment in which the doctrine is pursued that presents and magnifies the
differences in outcome between the two environments. As a result, managers
need to realize that the dogma of product liability is essentially the same in
the United States and in Europe. In parallel, lawyers must attempt to peel
back the procedural onion to help managers understand the basic dogma and
show that business decisions should be made on roughly the same grounds in
both the U.S. and in Europe.

I1.AMERICAN TREATMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
In the last 50 years, the American legal profession has witnessed
profound changes in product liability tort law. 51 Evolving from a primordial
brew of 1 9th Century contract law and tort concepts, products liability law
developed into a viable litigation alternative by extending the scope of a
producer's duty to foreseeable users and others, regardless of contractual
relation.52 However, postwar America was simply not satisfied, as pent up
consumer demand allowed the manufacturing sector to provide consumers
with wonderful new products, thus creating a similar rise in the number of
injuries caused by these products. As injuries increased, the cry for reform
grew louder. The landmark decisions of the 1960's such as Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products rode the crest of
reform culminating in the publishing of The Restatement (Second) of Torts
in 1964. "
t
50See, e.g., Dreisonstok v Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F2.d 1066 (4" Cir. 1974) (Generally it is the legal

entity authorized to do business in the respective country that is actually liable but the mother business
suffers from lost returned profits.); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (For
a glimpse at the procedural nightmare caused when international parties are involved in a product liability
lawsuit.)
51While the ancestry of contract law remains a significant part of US product liability law and is
embodied in various provisions of the UCC, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, and the Restatement (Second)
of Torts §402B, it is not treated in this paper - See Denny v. Ford Motor Co., 662 N.E. 2d 730 (N.Y.
1995)(For an interesting comparison of tort and warranty theories).
2
See, e.g., Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng.Rep.402 (Ex.1842) as an example of
establishing the privity requirement for products liability suits; Huset v. J.I. Case Threshing Mach. Co.,
120 Fed. 865 (8' Cir.1903) as an example of establishing three exceptions to the privity requirement;
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co. II I N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
"' See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (APPROVED BY THE A.L.I,
1965).
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For products liability law, the key part to the revision was §402A,
which abandoned the failure-to-use-due-care standard (i.e. determine what
the producer did to prevent the tort) and adopted an is-there-a-dangerousdefect standard (i.e. determine if the defect harmed the consumer) when
assigning liability. 14 The strict liability theory was a breakthrough for
plaintiffs because the burden of proof was reduced to the point ofjust having
to show that the defect caused the plaintiffs injury. Jumping on the
evolutionary bandwagon, many states adopted §402A. As the Great Society
was pushed to the background by faded rust-belt inspired dreams55 , courts
and legislators began to switch gears. As if taking natural cues, such as from
the laws of thermodynamics, 56 legislators and courts began to relax some of
the "strict" liability concepts. 57
Exceptions were created for design defect and warning defect cases.
These cases returned to negligence concepts that employ the risk-utility
analysis, such as state of the art defense and reasonable alternative designs.58
The risk-utility analysis for design and warning defects remains the dominant
analysis method for US products liability law and is recognized by legal
scholars. 5' However, there are still some jurisdictions that refuse to
acknowledge the analysis and strict liability exceptions. These courts
continue to apply the consumer expectations for design and warning
defects.6 °
More commonality in the application of strict liability remains
applied to manufacturing defect cases, presumably because manufacturers

s' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (APPROVED BY THE A.L., 1965) §402A. "One who sells any

product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer..."
55"Rust-belt" is a colloquial expression that refers to the industrial regions of Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin. These areas have predominantly been automotive and steelrelated industries, which suffered severe economic crises from the 1970's through the early 1990's, which
resulted in the shuttering of many manufacturing facilities. Many of the facilities sat unused for long
periods and corroded, hence the name "Rust-belt".
56 The third law of thermodynamics may be summarized that all things will move from a state of
maximum order to a state of minimum order. The situation where all US states apply strict liability as
defined in §402A is one of maximum order whereas the situation where all US states apply some mixture
of strict liability and negligence is one of minimum. See RICHARD E. SONNTAG & GORDON J. VAN
WYLEN, INTRODUCTION TO THERMODYNAMICS 190 ( 3 ID ED. 1991) (For an explanation of the third law of
thermodynamics).
57See, e.g., N.J.STAT. ANN. §2A:58C-3 (statute provides for a state of the art defense for producers in
product liability actions).
58
See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Harper, 61 S.W.3d 118, 124 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Rudd v. General
Motors Corp., 127 F.Supp.2d 1330 (M.D. A.L 2001); Soule v. General Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298 (Cal.
1994) (Comparing consumer expectations with risk-utility analysis).
" See David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective
Products, 49 U.Chi.L.Rev. 1, 16-47 (1982) (For a good discussion on the balancing done by engineers in
the context of the Grimshav Ford Pinto litigation).
' See, e.g., McCathen v. Toyota Motor Corp., 23 P.3d 320 (Or. 2001) (adopting a consumer expectations
standard for a roll-over case).
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could at least factor such loses in their meager business plans; and, because
manufacturing is a statistical process, such losses could be more readily
calculated than design and warning defects. The strict liability test for
manufacturing defects that is widely accepted is the deviation from the
manufacturing specifications (design, part drawings, standards, etc.) 6 1 In the
experience of the author, such a test is also the same used by the auto
industry itself when determining whether a product or part has sufficient
62
quality. Such a test apparently has support among legal scholars as well.
Notwithstanding the wholesale adoption of "strict" liability, there are
some states that have held out.6 3 For example, in Delaware, strict liability has
been "preempted" by the UCC for sales cases.6 4 In Michigan, birthplace of
the American auto industry, negligence, which looks to the conduct of a
manufacturer to prevent injury, and implied warranty, which looks to the
condition of the product, are used instead of strict liability.65 Under such
theories, the burden of proof imposed on the plaintiff is significantly higher
than that imposed in cases of strict liability. In Fleck v. Titan Tire
Corporation, the court recites a six-prong test that Michigan courts use to
determine if plaintiffs have satisfied the burden of proof imposed for design
defect cases. 66 However, a close reading of the six-prong test reveals that
Michigan courts are probably using a risk-utility analysis under another name.
The issue of burden of proof warrants an additional discussion at this
point. While the Michigan courts appear to use a tough, six-prong test for
the plaintiffs burden of proof, other jurisdictions reach the same high
standard for plaintiffs by imposing a very high standard to determine whether
their expert witnesses, essential to any case turning on technical issues of any
magnitude, are qualified to testify. This standard is embodied in present
litigation as a preliminary evidentiary procedure known as a Daubert hearing,
wherein the expert witness is judged qualified to testify according to five
factors:
61 See

Magnuson v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 844 S.W. 2d 448 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Rix v. General Motors

Corp., 723 P.2d. 195 (Mont. 1986); McKenzie v. S K Hand Tool Corp., 650 N.E.2d 612 (llI.App.Ct.1995).
62 See Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 427, 467-74 (1993)(Discussing rationales for strict liability as applied to manufacturing
defects).
63 Madden & Owen Torts
Smith v. DaimlerChrysler, No. CA No. 94C-12-002-JEB, 2002 Del. Super. LEXIS 434, at 4 (Del.
Supr. Ct. Nov. 20, 2002, Decided).
'$See Fleck v. Titan Tire Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613-614 (E.D. Mi. 2001) (Citing Prentice v. Yale
Mfg. Co., 365 N.W.2d 176, 186 (Mich. 1984).
' Fleck v. Titan Tire Corp., 177 F. Supp. 2d 605, 613-614 (E.D. MI. 2001) (Citing Hollister v. Dayton
h
Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 738 (6 Cir 2000) (The six factors considered by the court were, "(I) that
the severity of the injury was foreseeable by the manufacturer; (2) that the likelihood of occurrence of her
injury was foreseeable by the manufacturer at the time of distribution of the product; (3) that there was a
reasonable alternative design available; (4) that the available alternative design was practicable; (5) that
the available and practicable reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risk of
harm posed by the defendant's product; and (6) that omission of the available and practicable reasonable
alternative design rendered defendant's product not reasonably safe.")
6See
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Testability - whether the theory is testable and has been tested
according to scientific methods.
Peer review - has the theory been subject to peer review.
Error rate - whether the theory has an acceptable or known rate of
error.
Control standards - whether the theory has been subjected to
appropriate standards of control.
General acceptance - whether67 the theory is widely accepted in the
relevant scientific community.

This test has been refined and applied to the automotive industry through
subsequent cases so that plaintiffs' experts, and therefore the viability of their
cases, are always subjected to the standard as espoused in Daubert. 68 The
impact of such a test has served to create a high hurdle for plaintiffs to pass
on the road to a successful products liability suit, especially where design and
warning defects are alleged. This is especially significant in the automotive
industry simply because of the complexity of many of the designs, the cost of
testing and prototypes, and the availability of suitable experts.
The lack of consistency in U.S. products liability law, especially
concerning design and warning defects cases, has lead many legal thinkers to
react with the drafting and release of the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability. However in true legal form, jurisdictions have been
glacially slow in adopting the Restatement (Third). Despite the fact that the
Restatement (Third) may represent a desirable legal standard for products
liability, many seem to reject it on the basis that it is a wolf in sheep's
clothing, i.e. a proposal for reform dressed up as a restatement of existing
law. The result has created further uncertainty, so much so that Torts
professors just throw up their hands in response to students' questions on
what exactly the law is. While a bit of Shakespearian-inspired irony to the
tune of Hamlet may be brushed off in the classroom, it does not sit well with
many managers in the business world, in particular, in the automotive
industry.
The apparent absence of a uniform definition in US product liability
law, for design and warning defects, between states may leave conservative
European managers averse to starting any business in the United States. 69
Perhaps it is more an issue of understanding, or lack thereof, of the state of
67 Daubert

v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)

68See General Electric Co. v. Joiner. 118 S.Ct. 512 (1997) (applying abuse of discretion as the standard

for review for trial court's decision of whether to qualify a person as an expert witness according to the
Daubert factors); Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999) (holding that the Daubert
factors apply to engineering expert witnesses).
69 See 2000 COM 0893 (2000) (Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on
Liability for Defective Products ) 9
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the US law. This may occur because, in general, European business tends to
be studied and planned ad nauseum. Lack of certainty in business is therefore
undesirable and the idea of being slapped with a series of billion dollar
verdicts is highly repugnant to any business-person, especially one who does
not understand the US system of jury verdicts and punitive damages. But are
the fundamentals any more different in Europe? Is the US system more
favorable to consumers? Perhaps it is the intermediate outcome rather than
the final result that clouds the answer.
III. EUROPEAN TREATMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
The Civil Law dominates the European legal landscape. While
numerous treatises have been written on Civil Law systems and how they
compare to Common Law systems, the purpose here will be just to refresh
the reader with its origins. The Civil Law has its roots in Roman and
Germanic law traditions. Roman law did protect contractual relationships
between sellers ("producers") and buyers ("consumers"). 70 Since the
doctrine of product liability is rooted in tort-contract hybrid warranties of
quality, express and implied, it evolves naturally from the Roman Law
heritage and is suited for European states. 71 The evolution has been slow
since, until recent years, contractual privity between parties was an essential
element in maintaining a product liability claim in a European Union
member state.72 Indeed, the Civil Law tends to emphasize laws mainly in
terms of contractual obligations.73
Several European Legislative actions as well as recent political
events have created optimum conditions under which product liability law
has been able to germinate on the continent to equal and exceed that of the
United States in terms of regulation and rigidity. While a comprehensive
discussion on the organization of the European Union is beyond the scope of
this paper, key documents are listed below, along with a brief explanation of
their relevance towards the European Union organization in the context of
product liability law.
Treaty of Rome (1957)
This document sets up a federal-type framework with a legislative
body that is composed of (1)a European Parliament that is made up of
popularly elected members, (2) a Council of European Union (Council of
Ministers) made up of representatives appointed by member states; a judicial
body that is the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which has jurisdiction over
70 DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & W. PAGE KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 17

( 3rd ed. 1996) (Quoting Justinian's Digest, Book 19, Tit. 1, Lex 13).
71DAVID G. OWEN, JOHN E. MONTGOMERY & W. PAGE KEETON, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND SAFETY 16
(3d ed. 1996).
72See PATRICK KELLY & REBECCA ATTREE, EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITIES ( "d ed. 1997)
2
73See B.S. MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS 20 ( "ded. 1990).
2
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disputes involving member states, European Union institutions, businesses,
and individuals; and an executive body that is the European Commission.
The Treaty of Rome and its subsequent amendments form the "Constitution"
of the European Union.74 By agreeing to the provisions of the Treaty,
member states have given up certain legal duties to a larger, regional
governmental entity in much the same way as the US states have done by
agreeing to be admitted to the Union of the United States.
Consumer Protection and Information Programme (1975)
This document was adopted by the Council of Ministers on April 14,
1975. The promulgation of this program eventually led to the creation of an
action plan that ultimately led to Council Directive 85/374/EC.75
Council Directive 85/374/EC (1985)
This document (the Directive) is the kernel of European Union
product liability law. According to Kelly & Attree, the Directive "was issued
to implement ... a strict liability system to compensate consumers..." 7 6 The
Directive is analogous to the Model or Uniform codes issued by the
American Law Institute in the United States in that the Directive contains a
model law that was to be adopted by individual states. The main difference
is that the Directive also includes a requirement that all member states were
to have implemented the Directive by 1988. By implementing the Directive,
member states were to have passed national product liability laws patterned
after the model law in the Directive. All member states have implemented the
Directive into their national laws with France being the last.
The importance of the Directive for litigators cannot be
underestimated. The relationship between the Directive and the national law
of the member states is recited in Veedfald v. Amtskommune, where the ECJ
stated the following:
Although it is left to national legislatures to determine the
precise content of those two heads of damage, nevertheless, save for
non-material damage whose reparation is governed solely by
national law, full and proper compensation for persons injured by a
defective product must be available in the case of those two heads of
damage. Application of national rules may not impair the
effectiveness of the Directive (see, to this effect, the judgment in
Case C-365/88 Hagen [1990] ECR 1-1845, paragraph 20) and the
national court must interpret its national law in the light of the
wording and the purpose of the Directive (see, in particular, the

7' EUROPA - Institutions of the European Union at http://europa.eu.int/inst-en.htm.
" EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITIES 10 (Patrick Kelly & Rebecca Attree. eds., 2'd ed. 1997).
761Id. at

I1.

2003-2004]

Product Liability in the U.S. & Europe

judgment in Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann [1984] ECR 891,
paragraph 26).7
Such language clarifies that the Directive is the Bible for European product
liability law for the member states to follow.
Amendments to the Treaty of Rome:
Several key amendments to the Treaty of Rome were (1) the Single
European Act (1986) and (2) the Maastricht Treaty (1993). The Single
European Act further enabled passage of European Union legislation geared
towards consumer protection by eliminating the requirement that the Council
of Ministers agree unanimously to new legislation, therefore making it easier
to pass more controversial consumer protection legislation. The Maastricht
Treaty further enabled passage of consumer protection measures by
amending various articles of the Treaty of Rome to give power to the
European Union to adopt consumer protection laws. 8
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

The European Court of Justice has recently decided in two cases,
Sanchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA and Commission v. France, that the
Directive must be implemented into national law of member states
practically verbatim, even if the national law provides consumers with more
favorable protection. 79 In particular, both decisions chastised the respective
national governments, Spain and France, for not following the Directive. As
a result, the Directive sets forth the central product liability roadmap for all
member states to follow. An analysis of the Directive is therefore useful to
the litigator or businessperson.
The Directive is divided into 22 Articles:
Article I is short and sweet. It states, "The producer shall be liable
This statement is very
for damage caused by a defect in his product."
similar to that of §402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The Directive
assigns a "strict" liability for damage caused by defective products.
Article 2 defines a product as "all moveables" (with some
agricultural exceptions irrelevant to the auto industry), and Article 3 defines
a producer as a manufacturer of a finished product (e.g a car), raw material,
or component part, or anyone, who by way of a trademark or other feature
"presents himself as a producer". Importers are also designated "producer"
v Case C-203/99, Veedfald v. Amtskommune, 27 E.C.R. 1-3569 (2001).
"
7 EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITIES I I (Patrick Kelly & Rebecca Attree. eds., 2 , ed. 1997).
79 See Case C-183/00, Sanchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, E.C.R. 1-3901 (2002); Case C-52/00,
Commission v. France, E.C.R. 1-3827 (2002).
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by the Directive. And when the "producer" is not identifiable, product
suppliers (dealers, retailers) shall be jointly liable to the injured party until
the suppliers reveal the identity of the actual producer.
Article 4 assigns the burden of proof for presence of damage, defect,
and causation of damages by the defect to the injured party. In practical
terms, this probably does more to prevent widespread product liability
litigation in Europe than any other provision of the Directive. Simply put, in
a system where parties must pay for legal services as they go, this provision
stops plaintiffs from investing heavily in uncertain litigation.
Several other articles are noteworthy in their similarity to American
product liability law. In particular, article 6 gives a consumer-expectation
test to determine whether a product is deemed defective. Article 7 provides
for a number of defenses including state of the art, and defects, which arose
after the product was put into circulation. Article 8 creates a provision for
producers to reduce (or eliminate) a damage award through a showing of
contributory negligence (e.g. misuse) by the injured party. Article 9 limits
recoverable damages to physical injuries and damage to private property.
Economic loss is not included. Article 10 provides for a statute of limitations
of 3 years after the plaintiff becomes "aware, or should reasonably have
become aware, of the damage, the defect, and the identity of the producer." 80
Article 11 provides for a 10 year statute of repose.
A comparison of the national code of a member state, such as
Germany, to the Directive, shows that the national laws adopted from the
model set forth in the Directive are essentially the same in both format and
legal content, with some economizing of statutory language. For example,
the Deutsche Gesetz Ober die Haftung fir fehlerhafte Produkte (the German
Act Concerning Liability for Defective Products) contains 19 paragraphs or
articles instead of the 22 listed in the Directive.81 Paragraph I is basically a
combination of Directive articles 1, 4, 7, and part of 9. However, a close
reading of the German statute reveals, especially in light of the recent
decisions of Sanchez v. Medicina Asturia SA and Commission v. France, the
core meaning is the same. 82
On a gut level, the Directive, and therefore the national product
liability law of the European Member States, emulates the American product
liability law as presented in the Restatement (Third) of Torts, with several
differences. The Directive adopts strict liability for products that are
8oUnderline added.
' BGB I. 1S. 2198, PRODHAFTG 27, translated in SIMON L. GOREN, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 483, Annex
II (Rev. Ed. 1994).
82 See Case C-183/00, Sanchez v. Medicina Asturiana SA, E.C.R. 1-3901 (2002); Case C-52/00,
Commission v. France, E.C.R. 1-3827 (2002).
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defective in that they fail the consumer expectations test, but presents some
risk utility concepts by allowing the use of the state of the art and misuse
84
defenses. 83 In this way, the Directive is like the Restatement (Third).
However, the Directive diverges by allowing a statute of repose (thus
favoring producers) and also by placing the burden of proof on
85 the injured
party (also favoring producers in a pay-as-you-go legal system).
Considering the European burden of proof requirement literally, it
could be said that it places a burden on European plaintiffs that is as high as
does the Daubert hearing or state imposed burdens such as that imposed in
Michigan. Given this comparison, it could be said that the levels of
screening achieved by both US and European product liability litigation
"systems" are roughly equivalent. Considering, however, the reality of the
European judicial practice suggests that the real burden of proof standard
imposed by judges is lower.86 With this in mind, it should be that most
businesses would be more afraid of marketing products in Europe than in the
United States. There are several factors to the US system that are missing in
Europe - (1) a lack of a comprehensive social insurance system available to
absorb product injuries, (2) a legal system where plaintiffs' attorneys bear
costs of litigation (court fees, experts, etc), and (3) a jury composed of nonjudicial members that probably sympathize more with the plight of plaintiffs
83Council Directive 85/374/EEC, Articles 1, 6, and 7, 1985 O.J. (L210) 29.
" Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Prod. Liab. (APPROVED BY THE A.L.l, 1997) §1, §2 cmt. d

(1997) with Council Directive 85/374/EEC, Art. 1,6, and 7(c) 1985 O.J. (L210) 29 (However the
Restatement does not frame the state of the art defense as an affirmative defense but rather as a question of
whether a reasonable alternative design existed at time of sale, thus folding in a discussion of state of the
art).
85 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: Prod. Liab. (APPROVED BY THE A.L.l, 1997) §3 cmt. c
(1997) with Council Directive 85/374/EEC, Art. 10, 4, 1985 O.J. (L210) 29 (respectively).
86 See Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability for Defective
Products, COM(00)893 final at 14-15.
It indicates, however, that national Courts have already developed ways to facilitate the burden
of proof.
- In Sweden it is for the judge to assess the causal relation, particularly in technically complex
cases. The burden of proof had been reduced by the courts in certain situations ('probability').
- In Finland, under the principle of the free assessment of evidence, the judge can take into
account the difficulty of establishing the defect in a product or a causal relation.
- In Germany, according to the law on civil procedure, the Court is free to assess and judge
evidence in the individual case. Causality was established in several cases on the basis of prima
facie proof, when damage arose in the normal course of events.
- When the product disappeared (e.g. an exploding bottle) and when it was difficult to find the
origin of the defect, in Spain judges based their decisions on assumptions.
- Judges in the Netherlands used the power to overthrow the burden of proof in exceptional
cases, e.g. in the case of the defect in the product.
- In Denmark, the requirements of proof depend on each case and are decided by the judge.
There are several judgements where consumers had been unable to furnish proof and where the
court had asked the producer to provide rebuttal evidence.
- According to legal practice in France and Belgium, the defect of a product can be proven in
any way, by evidence and by probability. The judge can infer the causal link ('the equivalence
of conditions').
- In the United Kingdom the simple balance of probabilities test (this means at least 51%) is
applied to issues of damage, defect and causation.
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than the European court-appointed experts. The impact of these ingredients
is hard to quantify, but perhaps these uncertain factors make the US. still
seem more attractive for plaintiffs. Maybe it is that lack of certainty that may
make foreign managers afraid of selling products in the United States.
Without such factors, most injured plaintiffs, unless vindication is an extreme
motive, would probably walk away.
Despite the absence of such uncertain factors, the Europeans appear
to have safe products and businesses appear to have just a hard a time in
Europe as in the US when it comes to marketing unsafe or defective products.
The basic idea of the Directive, when laid out next to the Restatement (Third),
suggests that common values exist between the US and Europe regarding
product liability law. Subsequent legislative action taken by the European
Union shows that Europeans are definitely concerned about defective
products and the scrutiny to which producers are held. However, the manner
of execution and resolution of these concerns appears to focus on legislative
and regulatory areas.
Several European Union actions must be therefore be examined,
including the European Commission's Green Paper, subsequent resolution,
the Report from the Commission on the Application of the Directive (the
Report), subsequent resolution, and the General Product Safety Directives.
The Green Paper, a report initiated by the European Commission and
subsequently resulting resolution by the European Parliament, shows that the
European Union was concerned about product safety, albeit slow to bring
such concerns to real or concrete decision.87 The resolution adopted by
European Parliament shows that a comprehensive reform was desired.88
However, the Report, and the subsequent resolution, drastically toned down
the position of the resolution from the Green Paper. 9
There is a nugget of clear policy buried, however, in the results of
the Green Paper. Before the European Parliament adopted the Green Paper
resolution, the Economic and Social Committee delivered an opinion that
recommended the Commission to "formulate a far-reaching prevention
policy, also extending and strengthening European standards." 90 This
recommendation was apparently heeded with the adoption of the General
Product Safety Directive (GPSD) (2001/95/EEC), which is a comprehensive
87

See Green Paper Liability for Defective Products, COM(99)396 final [hereinafter Green Paper];

Bulletin EU 3-2000 (for a good summary of the resolution adopted by the European Parliament as a result
of the Green Paper), at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200003/pIO3026.htm.
" Bulletin EU 3-2000 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200003/p103026.htm.
89Compare Bulletin EU 3-2000 (the resolution from the Green Paper, calling for a "broad dialogue") at
http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200003/p I 03026.htm. with Bulletin EU I / 2- 2001 (the resolution
from the Report from the Commission, stating, "the Commission... considers that the directive need not be
amended...") at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200003/p I 03026.htm.
" Bulletin EU 3-2000 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200003/pl03026.htm.
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regulatory scheme. 91 The 15 member states will have until 2004 to
implement the GPSD.92
Ultimately, the GPSD is a revision of an earlier Product Safety
Directive (92/59 EEC)(1992). 93 While a complete discussion of both of these
directives is beyond the scope of this article, the key piece of information is
that both directives are regulatory in nature with enforcement of provisions to
be carried out by national governments against producers and others.94 Such
developments represent a divergence of the way in which European product
liability law is enforced with the way in which US product liability law is
enforced.
While European actions such as the Green Paper, the Report, and
recent European case law support a single product liability directive that
results in litigative enforcement of product liability law, the emergence of the
Product Safety Directive and the GPSD, along with an increasing number of
European agencies, show that Europe is moving towards regulative
enforcement of product liability law.95
V. CONCLUSION: IMPACT ON BUSINESSES

One of the fundamental questions in products liability deals with
In a purely capitalistic society, producers need external
incentives.
incentives to produce products that are free of defects. In the United States,
the external incentive is the reduced litigation caused by attempts to
eliminate defects by manufacturing and designing products according to best
practices that in turn leads to reduction of injuries. In Europe, the external
incentive is the satisfaction of regulators achieved through attempts to
eliminate defects by manufacturing and designing products according to a
multitude of regulations that in turn leads to reduction of injuries.
Of course, this comparison is over-simplified because, the United
States promulgates reams of regulations, especially concerning motor
vehicles (e.g. FMVSS Crash, C.A.F.E.), and product liability litigation
occurs in Europe (Veedfald v. Amtskommune). However, the main point is
to show where the emphasis is placed in terms of motivating producers to
make safe products such as vehicles.

"' See Council Directive 2001/95/EC 2002 O.J. (L. I1)(The General Product Safety Directive).
92 id.

93Id.

See EUROPEAN PRODUCT LIABILITIES 18-25 (Patrick Kelly & Rebecca Attree eds. 2'ned. 1996)
(contains a comprehensive explanation of the 1992 Product Safety Directive); Council Directive
2001/95/EC 2002 O.J. (L.1 I) (The General Product Safety Directive).
95 A look on the European Union website available at http://www.europa.eu.intlagencies/ shows the
current number of agencies at sixteen with one newly created.
'4
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The end results of both the US and European product liability
enforcement mechanisms are very similar. Vehicle recalls occur in both the
US and Europe. Component manufacturers use the same safety test standards
when designing automotive components.96 Manufacturers still demand zero
defects from their suppliers and will stop production if safety becomes an
Injuries due to defects are still
issue in either design or manufacturing.
settled out of court. 98 Because such events all pose significant costs to a
business plan, businesspeople tend to factor their plans accordingly, but in
slightly different manners:
A US venture needs to account for legal services
(litigation) and a European venture needs to account for legal
services (regulation). Understanding that both of these costs
must be built into the respective business plans will help
even smaller companies realize that overseas markets are
realizable. Such a business approach to products liability
will help eliminate much of the fear that acts as a general
deterrent for a business to enter a new market place.
Understanding the fact that the basic doctrines of product
liability in Europe and the US are quite similar, despite
different procedural wrangling, will also help managers
understand that the overall focus on zero defects, safety, and
satisfied customer expectations is identical in both Europe
and the US. As a result, the central business mission that is
successful on one continent should not turn all of a sudden
negative on another continent simply because of an
"unforeseen" legal issue. It is also likely that a product that
is problematic on one continent from a safety point of view
will also be equally problematic on another continent.
96 The author's design engineering experience at a major European supplier of automotive seats found that

European vehicle manufacturers wanted their seating systems subjected to FMVSS crash tests even for
models intended for sale only in Europe.
" At one point in the author's engineering experience, the author demanded that component production
was stopped because of the risk posed by insufficient structural performance of a component seat frame
design and that production not continue until the design was changed and old stock was scrapped!
"8 See COM(01)0893 (Report from the Commission on the Application of Directive 85/374 on Liability
for Defective Products at http://www.europa.cu.int/comm/intemal_market/eu/goods/liability/reportEN.pdf)
The number of product liability cases seems to be relatively low. In the vast majority (90%,
according to the German and Dutch insurers) these claims are settled out of court, in particular
when the facts (i.e. the defect, the damage and the causal link) are clear. Business recognises
the benefits of settling genuine, validated claims by avoiding the length and costs of litigation.
In these cases, liability is not an issue and all that remains to discuss is compensation. While
some consider the out-of-court settlement a mechanism which functions well, consumer

organisations criticise it since the details of the settlement often remain confidential and
because producer and insurers have an inequitably advantageous position.
Given the high number of out-of-court settlements, it is said that victims are compensated in
general quickly and efficiently. With regard to cases brought before the national courts, the
question of a swift solution is more a question of the speed and efficiency of the national
systems of civil procedure than of the adequacy of the substantive law.

